Introduction
Modern industrial development processes of new technologies are characterized by an increasing complexity and interdependence of the different actors combining different knowledge assets. Today, hardly any innovation can be assigned to one specific technological field. Also, the sciences are becoming increasingly differentiated and specialized, thus enhancing the necessity of horizontal and vertical knowledge transfer between the actors of innovation processes. In this context, where single actors and even single firms are unable to keep pace with technological progress, the idea of collective invention becomes obvious.
Concerning this, two points emphasized by modern innovation theory are of importance: First, the overwhelming significance of cross-fertilization-effects are recognized (e.g. Mokyr, 1990) .
In a technological development inevitably confronted with bottlenecks, new developmental potentials can be created (-in the first place -) by the amalgamation of different technologies.
Second, these technological interdependencies are mediated mainly by technological spillovers, which are no longer a natural feature of technological know-how. The knowledgebased approach of modern innovation theory makes firm specificities as well as a technology specifities responsible for an only curtailed unavoidable emergence of spillovers. However, these positive externalities are a widely-spread phenomenon and claim for an economic explanation.
Informal networks, i.e. loose relationships between firms, as well as between scientists and engineers are identified as an industrial organizational device, in which new technological knowledge is freely shared and distributed, and which can be considered as an important source of spillover effects (Freeman, 1991) . However, within the neoclassical approach, if recognized at all, this behaviour apparently is at odds with myopic self-interest and can only be explained in highly artificial and ad hoc ways (Silverberg, 1988) . Therefore, in modern innovation theory other approaches are invoked, allowing to model informal networks to develop as collective phenomena. In particular, the theory of self-organization seems to be appropriate in order to allow for only procedural rational agents, which in a cumulative and path-dependent process constitute cooperative or non-cooperative environments (Pyka, 1997) . In this modeling framework the institutions of informal networks can self-organize as emergent properties in dependence of the technological intensity of firms' surroundings as well as on critical fluctuations which in a way represent the feature of intrinsic uncertainty of innovation processes.
In this paper the basic modeling framework of the evolution of informal networks is combined with some stylized facts of the time patterns of the industrial evolution sketched by the theory of industry life cycles. Integrating time-independent transition rates excludes the possibility of analytical solutions, so numerical simulation experiments have to be performed. The results of these experiments show structural developments at least qualitatively according to the predictions of life cycle theory. Most unexpectedly -from a traditional point of view -large informal networks as a potential source of technological spillovers can sometimes be observed in a state of the industry life cycle where R&D endeavours of firms are assumed to be already concentrated on exploiting scale economies and process technologies instead of exploring new technological opportunities. The paper is organized as follows: In the second part the theoretical framework of informal networks in an industry life cycle context is discussed. Part 3 deals with the formal structure of the self-organization approach to model informal networks and some first analytical results.
In part 4 we simulate the respective system in order to integrate time patterns of the willingness to cooperate. The final part 5 finishes the discussion with some conclusions.
Informal Networks in an Industrial Life Cycle Context
Modern technical solutions are increasingly characterized by an interrelatedness between heterogeneous actors and knowledge fields. According to Joly and Mangematin (1995) two reasons are mainly responsible for this growing complexity of innovation processes: On the one hand the sheer number of different material inputs required for innovation and production has increased immensely. On the other hand, also the number of knowledge fields and skills necessary for innovation and production is growing steadily. No single firm can keep pace with the development of all relevant technologies. Therefore, firms must have access to external knowledge sources. This is even more important at early phases of the technological development, where technological uncertainty as well as financial constraints of new start-up companies face innovative actors with severe difficulties and contingencies. Informal networks or cooperative environments are an important organizational device for external learning, helping firms to cope with this growing complexity.
-Technological uncertainty
The search for new technologies is a risky and uncertain endeavour. This uncertaintyintrinsic to the innovation process -does not allow either to predict the timing, nor the technological features nor the economic consequences of innovations: on the one hand, firms try to find new technological solutions for their production processes with ex-ante not anticipated consequences; on the other hand, new unforeseen and unexpected discoveries external to a firm may change the current situation. Thus, firms' decisions including their behaviour to exchange know-how cannot be described in a neoclassical optimization context but are to be seen as bounded rational.
-Technological opportunities
The development space within which firms learn and which firms attempt to explore consists of a broad set of technological opportunities providing potentials for progress. Here several regularities can be observed. First, the developmental potential of a specific technology is increasingly exhausted with progress on the respective technological trajectory. So-called intensive technological opportunities (Coombs (1988) ) are becoming depleted step by step.
By this technological as well as scientific boundaries come into effect more and more making further improvements increasingly difficult and sometimes even impossible to achieve.
Second, besides intensive opportunities characterizing a specific technology there are also extensive technological opportunities which arise out of cross-fertilization among different technologies (Mokyr (1990) Therefore, it is necessary to know whether these spillovers are only caused by imperfect appropriability conditions or whether they are actively initiated by firms. In other words, are they unplanned spillovers (Chesnais (1996) ) going hand in hand with defective effects or purposefully initiated organizational devices? In the following, it will be argued that a prominent source of these spillovers are informal networks where firms voluntarily exchange new know-how in order to explore new extensive technological opportunities.
-Informal networks
The necessity to draw back on external knowledge sources has stimulated new mechanisms of collective action. These learning possibilities are a strong motive to behave cooperatively, which trade-off the opening up of extensive opportunities, and the acquisition of knowledge against potential losses due to cheating and opportunism 7 . The increasing complexity of technological knowhow forces firms to seek access to external knowledge sources with the important consequence that they also have to be such an external knowledge source in a broader context.
Through the knowledge exchange processes a stable cooperative environment can be created.
According to the respective share of cooperative attitudes, this increases the chance of a realization of surplus.
- Klepper and Graddy (1990) , Klepper (1997) , Klepper and Simons (1997) and Utterback (1987) ) have shown that in the early phases of new industries, which are mostly congruent to the emergence of a new technological paradigm, the market more or less is divided into small-and medium-sized firms. However, these Schumpeterian creative entrepreneurs (Schumpeter (1912) ) are restricted in their possibilities to finance expensive research projects. One possibility to surmount financial bottlenecks is the collective pushing forward of technological progress and the exploration of new extensive opportunities via knowledge exchange in informal networks.
However, due to success-breeds-success effects, the most successful firms will increasingly grow while less successful firms are threatened by exit from the market. This leads to a concentration process -only a few but large firms will finally rule the respective market.
"Implicitly, this involves a process whereby success breeds success, so that successful firms take over greater share of the market over time, leading to greater concentration." (Klepper, (1997, p. 151) In the sense of Schumpeter (1943) , these large enterprises are now less confronted with financial constraints in pushing ahead their specific research projects. On the one hand, they can more easily raise the necessary R&D budgets, on the other hand, at later stages of the technological development, technological opportunities are almost depleted directing the research endeavours more to incremental and less expensive technological improvements and the exploitation of scale economies. Thus, their willingness to behave cooperatively and share an informal network by generously making public new know-how is certainly decreasing.
Informal Networks in a Synergetic Framework
In the following we will introduce a theoretical approach to model the evolution of informal networks which also allows for the consideration of the time patterns most likely to occur in an industrial life cycle context. In contrast to neoclassical modelling our synergetic approach avoids the restrictive assumptions of perfect information and rationality by focusing on the routinized character of firm behaviour and the institutional character of innovation networks.
In particular this approach focuses on self-organizational features in the evolution of informal networks by explicitly considering the effect of the macro-environment i.e. the institutional character of an informal network.
First, the basic structure of the model and an analytical solution will be outlined before we show some numerical simulations which become necessary when time-dependent transition rates are included.
The Basic Structure of the Model
First we have to introduce a population of N firms which all are engaged in R&D. These firms are deciding in every period whether to behave according to a cooperative attitude 'c' and (1) non-cooperative environment. Concerning the latter, the firm feels only a low pressure to change its strategy and behave cooperatively. The probability of finding complementary know-how in a likewise small informal network is small. However, the possibility of crossfertilization effects grows with the size of the informal cooperation for two reasons: on the one hand, with a growing number of cooperative firms the quantity of the spillover pool also grows. On the other hand, at least in the short run, the quality of spillovers also increases with increasing heterogeneity of the firms participating in the network. With growing quantity and quality, the probability of combining seemingly inconsistent ideas increases. And the missing
know-how to detect the beneficial dynamic synergies is captured by this originally defective firm entering the network.
To represent this formally we use a simple linear relationship
The incentive to join the informal network i nc→c increases with increasing network size. The parameter β represents the intensity of R&D endeavours. A larger β value means a growing intensity of technology. This could also be interpreted as β representing technological uncertainty whereby we refer to the assumption -often found in the literature -that with increasing R&D intensity technological uncertainty increases also.
We assume that the advantages of the cooperative strategy are the disadvantages of the noncooperative strategy and vice versa; therefore transition rates are symmetric. In an overall noncooperative environment the pressure to change the cooperative attitude (c→nc) and behave defectively is likewise large. On the one hand, the potential disadvantages of falling behind by disclosing one's own knowledge, and the non-cooperative behaviour of others, has to be considered. On the other hand, the probability of finding complementary know-how and realizing the beneficial effects of the extensive opportunities is quite small in a more or less defective environment. But the incentive to behave defectively i c→nc decreases in an increasingly cooperative environment. To represent this, formally we get
Finally, we have to consider the time-dependence of the willingness of firms to cooperate. It is argued below that in early phases of the technological development firms are more likely willing to exchange their know-how due to technological as well as financial constraints.
However, this cooperative attitude decreases on later stages of the technology life cycle when the exploitation of scale economies and incremental innovations are in the centre of interest.
Formally, we consider this time-dependence of the willingness to cooperate by including a time-preference function δ(t) in the transition rates. In the most simple case we suppose a linear relationship of the preference function with respect to the industry life cycle:
0, where δ 0 represents the preference for cooperation at the beginning and r represents the rate of reduction in the course of time.
Drawing back on the elements above we get the following transition rates (5) describing the probability to switch to the cooperative strategy if initially non-cooperative and (6) vice versa:
where α is a scaling parameter. This exponential formulation usually found in the literature for transition rates has a twofold effect: First it normalizes the respective values to the positive area, as is necessary because of representing transition probabilities. This exponential formulation further ensures the effect of short-term self-enhancing and wide range attenuation. 11 At first, the growing network size supports the beneficial effects of the cooperative environment. But in the long run there are two reasons for an attenuation of this effect. On the one hand, there is a growing probability that the firms in the network have already realized the opportunities another firm outside the network can offer. On the other hand, the heterogeneity of firms in the network decreases because they will become technologically closer by sharing their know-how. 12 However, heterogeneity is a necessary precondition for a high information content of spillovers.
With these transition rates we can now formulate the master equation (7) describing the evolution of informal networks 11 See Eger and Weise (1995) and Gierer (1981) . 12 Dodgson (1996) where we used so-called total transition probabilities q nc→c and q c→nc describing the aggregate
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The first two terms on the r.h.s. of the master-equation (7) indicate the probability flows from neighbour states into the state Ñ , whereas the other two terms describe the flows which leave the respective state. The master equation can therefore be interpreted as a kind of profit and loss account of a single state.
The Analytical Treatment of the System
Time-dependent transition rates do not allow for an analytical solvability of our system. Therefore, we first ignore this time dependency by neglecting (4) and show some useful analytical features of our master-equation describing the evolution of informal networks.
Following Weidlich and Haag (1983) we can transform our discrete state space to a continuous one by introducing the variable x:
which describes the whole population as relative shares of cooperative (n 1 =N 1 /N) and noncooperative (n 2 =N 2 /N) firms. For time-independent total transition rates we get:
is the so called drift-coefficient 13 , which strikes the balance between both possible directions of change:
By integrating this drift-coefficient over the state space we get the potential function V(x)
This potential function can be used to derive an implicit picture of the development in the course of time without explicitly considering time t. 14 Resting points of a potential function are the respective minima, which cannot be left without an exogenous impulse. They represent so-called stationary solutions in which the development of the system's macro-structure has come to rest and only minor and balanced fluctuations on the micro-structure will occur. In fig. 2 we see the potential function for different values of the technological intensity β. fig. 2a ) β=0.8 fig. 2b ) β=1
13 Weidlich/Haag (1983) , p. 23. 14 See Erdmann (1993), pp. 27-3. fig. 2c ) β=1.25
The resting-point context is expressed by the black marble which come to a standstill in the attraction of an equilibrium at the bottom of the potential function. In the case of low technological intensity (β=0.8) shown in fig. 2a ) we find a unequivocal solution where the probability to find either a cooperative or a non-cooperative firm equals 0.5. So here, the firms are divided into two same-sized groups, one acting cooperatively, the other defectively. In an environment where technology is not of major importance, the effect of short-term selfenhancing and wide range attenuation is responsible for the by and large neglecting of the possibility of a larger informal network because of the likely technological resemblance caused by an exchange of know-how.
In the second scenario we increase technology intensity (β=1.0). The black marble does not stop here in an unequivocal minimum but rolls around in a quite flat valley of the potential function. Responsible for this is a significant decrease of the effect of the wide range attenuation. Higher technological intensity leads to slower depletion of the potentials of crossfertilization. Therefore, firms do not resemble each other in the same way as above, the exploration of new extensive opportunities becomes more likely even at more advanced phases of the technological trajectory. We find here a somewhat fuzzy solution including higher probabilities for larger non-cooperative environments as well as larger informal networks.
In the third scenario we increase technological intensity even further. With respect to the previous scenarios we find a totally changed development. Here, two different possible solutions can be clearly discriminated. The valley of the potential function into which the black marble will fall cannot be predicted but depends on critical fluctuations during the phase transition the system undergoes. There is a local minimum for a solution where defective 
Simulating the Evolution of Informal Networks
After these first analytical insights of the system we now include the time-dependence of the willingness to cooperate (4) into the transition rates supposed to occur in an industry life cycle context. In the case of time-dependent transition rates no longer any conclusion can be made by drawing back on potential functions; for the analysis of the evolution of informal networks numerical simulations of the respective system becomes unavoidable. Now, a stationary solution expressed by the minimum(a) of the potential function no longer exists, any specific developments taken place are continuously threatened by a changing environment maintaining the system's dynamics.
In a first simulation we again investigate a scenario with a low technology intensity (β=0.8).
Starting with an egalitarian distribution of cooperative and non-cooperative firms P (N 1 =N 2 ;0)=1 we get the development shown in figure 3a . Additionally, so-called density plots ( fig. 3b ) are pictured which show the development of the peak of the probability distributions in the course of time. Despite a low technological intensity, at the beginning of the industry life cycle we find a clear bias in the direction of larger informal networks which can be entirely traced back to the inclusion of the preference function. In the course of time the willingness to cooperate steadily decreases, following the preference function which continuously shifts towards defective behaviour. Accordingly, the probability of informal networks decreases in the course of the industry-life-cycle, firms try to keep their new know-how secret which more and more prevents larger spillover pools. In this scenario we do not find any unexpected consequences due to the original basic willingness to cooperate. At the end of the outlined development the preference for cooperation in the transition rates is so low that the probability to find firms engaged in informal know-how-exchange is almost zero. Not before the preference function increases even more, a sudden but abrupt wheeling around towards the strategy of secrecy is to be observed. Figure 5 illustrates this abrupt change by depicting phase-portraits of selected periods. Despite the original preference for cooperation, we again find a phase transition in the evolution of informal networks in this scenario. However, only after about two thirds of the time horizon investigated, a small probability for non-cooperative environments begins to increase, even if first on a likewise low level -the probability distribution becomes bimodal.
In the first instance this possibility of a non-cooperative solution is only a weak attractor which does not gain importance and influence before the final periods. Here, the decline in the individual preferences for cooperation reaches a critical threshold causing the probability of an informal network to decrease sharply.
In the context of industry-life-cycles the causes of this threshold effect can be seen in the shakeout of smaller cooperative firms at the final stage of the technological development.
Thus, at the end of our simulated development we can just assume a few larger, but noncooperative firms in that industry, now also characterized by a larger degree of concentration.
Conclusions
In a technological development characterized as a 'collective invention', cooperative environments can emerge via self-organization. Clark and Juma (1987, p. 170) state: ″Coping with non-linear situations requires effective information flows and systemic organization in which networking plays a significant role.″ 16 See Eliasson (1995) . 20 significant spillover pools can be found in industries characterized by a large technological intensity in even more mature phases of the development: here informal networks become a dominant attractor despite the intuitive expectation of a dominance of a strategy aiming at keeping new know-how secret.
The last point worth mentioning concerns methodological issues. With the integration of time patterns a first step is done to weaken the reproach often made to synergetics to model in fact development processes, but thereby not allowing the individual transition rates to develop. Of course, the time patterns integrated here, are of an exogenous nature, and an endogenous time
pattern is yet to be included. This will be on our future research agenda.
17 See Dodgson, M. (1993) and Freeman, C. (1991) .
